Friday, August 11, 2017

What value theory should we accept? (except from my book)

The writing of my book Value and Being is coming along. Truth be told - it is a book, but I still find it obnoxiously pretentious to say "I'm writing a book", which to me is equivalent to saying "Ooooo, the world better get ready!, I'm about to lay waste to the intellectual landscape!" I can hardly imagine universities, let alone individual scholars, put this book on their shelves, which makes me wonder for what purpose exactly am I writing it in the first place. I don't expect the audience to be professionals, although I am planning on sending digital copies to a few that I have contact with. I would say my audience is meant to be the "thoughtful" public, as well as the antinatalist community at large. Generally speaking, I have found the internet antinatalist community to not be very impressive or intelligent, and I aim to try to fix some of that.

Somewhere in the deep corners of my psyche there's a naysayer quietly whispering "you're a fucking dumbass...". I suppose when I eventually release my book we'll see if this little voice was right.

Anyway here's an except from one of the chapters in which I defend hedonism as the proper general theory of human welfare. Comments and critiques are welcome. I should also point out that throughout my book I use the terms "ethics" and "morality" interchangeably, as most professional moral philosophers do as well.
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§3.7 - What value theory should we accept?

Well-being, or welfare, are terms used by philosophers to designate that which is ultimately good for a person, and is what a rational and well-informed individual would pursue. Whatever makes a person’s life go better or worse is what is seen as intrinsically valuable to this person’s well-being. Generally speaking there are three camps in (welfare) value theory: objective list theories, hedonism, and desire satisfaction theories. Objective list theories tell us that there are some essential features that are required for a life to go “well”, such as knowledge, faith, friendship, money, etc. Hedonism holds that there is in fact only one objective good for a person: this person’s happiness or pleasure, which charitably is defined as any form of enjoyment (happiness is an attitudinal pleasure rather than a physical pleasure). Desire satisfaction theories are self-explanatory: what makes a person’s life go well depends on the satisfaction of desires. It may be tempting to see both hedonism and desire satisfaction theories as objective list theories, as both see one single objective thing to be valuable (pleasure and desire-satisfaction). But one single thing is hardly a “list”. So we’re better off keeping them separate.

To cut to the chase, I believe the most reliable representation of a person’s welfare is the theory of hedonism. The strongest point in favor of hedonism, I believe, is that attitudinal mental states intuitively act as the reason behind seeing many other things as instrumentally valuable. The reason we value friendship is because friends make us happy. The reason we value money is because money allows us to satisfy our desires which causes us pleasure.

Objective list theories struggle with justifying why particular features are important rather than other features - yet hedonism easily deals with this issue by seeing these features as instrumentally good. Whatever feature helps a person be happy is instrumentally valuable, and that is how we choose what to put on the list of objective features. People share common characteristics, so it is not surprising when their lists are similar to those of others - but hedonism also provides a strong foundation for alternate lists by people who are atypical in what makes them happy. Hedonism also explains why it is nonsensical to see objective features as good for a person if they make a person miserable - because the attitudinal experiences of a person are what ultimately constitute their well-being. Objective features may be sufficient but not necessary for well-being. Hedonism also explains why we hate seeing bad people enjoy being immoral; hedonism tells us happiness is good for a person, but not necessarily that it is good that a person is happy. It is a value theory, not an ethics.

Desire satisfaction theories struggle with the obvious problem that desires (or preferences, a term commonly used in economics) by themselves do not elevate a person’s well-being. If two people are equally comfortable, but differ in amount of preferences, the person with more preferences is not “better off” than the other person. Unless desires provided something, there would be no reason to satisfy them. Satisfying desires gives a person pleasure, and this pleasure is what makes the satisfaction of desires valuable to this person. So we can see the satisfaction of desires as generally necessary but not sufficient for well-being. The attraction of desire satisfaction theories - the liberty it gives each individual - is also one of its weaknesses. Its reluctance to criticize the desires of some people leads to it see self-harming desires as good for those who have them. A brainwashed person may strongly desire to stay in an abusive power structure, despite outsiders obviously understanding it to be bad for her well-being. A depressive may consider physically hurting themselves, but any level-headed individual would see this as alarming. An emotionally-abusive husband may manipulate his wife to stay in the relationship, but doing so would not be in the woman’s best-interests regardless of her desires otherwise. Yet desire satisfaction theories cannot see any of these situations as bad for these people. One route desire theorists have gone is to qualify desires as informed and self-regarding - yet this puts it quite close to hedonism, for an informed and self-regarding desire would seem to be just any desire the satisfaction of which makes a person happy. The bottom line is that enjoyment provides the incentive to satisfy desires, and that just is hedonism.

Hedonism has it’s own problems, but I do not think they are fatal to the theory. A classic argument against hedonism is Nozick’s experience machine, which tells us that we would find a life of hardship in the real world to be better for a person than a life of bliss in an experience machine. One problem with this thought experiment is that it seems to fail once we consider a really, really bad life in reality - in this case, our favor of the real world gives in to suffering. Perhaps living in the real world is important, but surely not as important as proliferate suffering. Indeed this is why many people turn to drugs, because the real world is too hard to experience.

Another issue with the thought experiment is that it assumes we already live in the real world. If it were the case that we actually did not live in the real world but failed to realize it, how big of a difference would it really make? It would seem as though what is important is not really the fact of living in the real world but rather the belief that one is living in the real world.

And finally, we can question whether people really would prefer to stay in the real world if they were well-informed, in the sense that they understood what the experience machine felt like and were not simply told it would be blissful. Once you know what the experience machine feels like, would you want to go back? There are, of course, extraneous reasons that prevent a person from plugging in, such as ethical or religious reasons. But these are not directly relevant to the question as hand, which is whether or not hedonism is an accurate portrayal of human welfare. In fact, if hedonism is correct, than people who prefer to stay in the real world are irrational and/or ill-informed. To maintain that people prefer to stay in the real world, and therefore reality is a non-hedonic good, is to assume the preferences of people dictate what is good for them. There may be other reasons for refusing to enter the experience machine, but taken as an isolated case with no strings attached, it would seem to be the case that a person with greater enjoyment is better off than a person with less enjoyment. That just is hedonism.

In my opinion, a bigger threat to hedonism is that unhappiness seems to be commonly a reaction to a loss of some other feature which constitutes a harm. I may become sad because I lost a friend - I am not simply sad because I no longer feel pleasure from their companionship but also believe that it just was good to have this person as a friend. But this perhaps is not as threatening as it initially seemed, for in this case it is seen as good that I have a friend and not necessarily that it was good for me that I have a friend. It may be the surrounding social environment that made me believe that it was good that I have a friend, and not my intrinsic enjoyment of having a friend.

However, there is something to be said about certain objective list features that may be relevant. Certainly J.S. Mill thought the "higher pleasures" made people better off than the "lower" ones, which his predecessor Jeremy Bentham denied. Here we have a sort of elitism - if we have two people with identical levels of enjoyment but with differing kinds of content, the one which a higher pleasure might be seen to be better off than the other. For example, enjoyment due to consuming alcohol may seem to be less good than enjoyment caused by reading Shakespeare, even if they are of the same level of enjoyment. Perhaps living in the "real" world is better than living in a simulated reality if both levels of enjoyment are equivalent. My intuition here is that this may be crossing over into the realm of ethics - that it's not good for a person to be in the real world or read Shakespeare but that it is good that a person gets the same level of enjoyment through these elite activities as they would through lesser ones.

What is especially important to point out is how not just the overall balance but the trajectory of a person’s life affects how this person’s life goes. Trajectory is, however, not entirely hedonistic: for it establishes that the shape of a person’s life is an important variable independent of how much pleasure and pain are in the life. A downhill-shaped life is not very good compared to an uphill-shaped life, even if they both have the same “amount” of enjoyment. It seems as though at least some basic consideration of the shape of a life that makes it better or worse - that ending a life on a positive note is better than ending a life on a negative note. Perhaps pure hedonism can still be saved by questioning whether it is actually possible for a downhill-shaped life to have the same amount of pleasure and pain as an uphill-shaped life - for perhaps pain after the fact is intrinsically worse felt simply from the knowledge of it being the after instead of before pleasure. If this route is persuasive, then what can be said is that downhill-shaped lives are worse than uphill-shaped lives because their structure prevents a person from enjoying the pleasures an uphill-shaped life might contain.

In summary, hedonism as a theory of human welfare straddles the line between respecting human differences and understanding fallibility. It is able to recognize that what a person prefers may not be what is best for them, but also that something that makes a person miserable cannot possibly be good for them. Therefore it is somewhat removed from a person's own awareness - how well-off a person is stands somewhat independently of their own mental states (this is ethically relevant). We may be tempted to believe certain objective features make a life better, but in many cases this seems to be confusing welfare with ethics. However, the trajectory of a person's life may make it the case that at least some objective features are important for welfare, as we would typically see a downwards-sloping life as worse than an upwards-sloping life, all things considered and irrespective of the persons' opinions. As it stands, it seems as though that objective features might act as a tie-breaker of well-being: enjoyment based on some specific feature may be better than enjoyment based on something else, even if they are equivalent levels of enjoyment.

Within the context of the negative perspective, trajectory-hedonism is a powerful model for well-being. The negative perspective sees basically all human lives to be downward-shaped. Most of the genuinely positive experiences happen in the beginning of life, when one is youthful and lithe. As we age, we lose our capacity to do things we used to like, we contract diseases, and we all eventually die. The inclusion of a life’s trajectory as essential to the value of a person’s life fits perfectly into the temporally-holistic model of the human condition established by the negative perspective. It may not be a complete model of human welfare, but it certainly seems to serve most situations well.

One quick note: the position of welfarism claims that the the ultimate justification for moral reasoning is rooted in the welfare of people. For a long while I was keenly attracted to welfarism, especially since I found hedonism to be the most reliable theory of welfare. What could be more important than the experiences of conscious agents? Trouble began to arise when I started to formulate the negative perspective. Some of the issues that arose will be explored in the next two chapters, but suffice to say I found hedonistic ethics to be problematic, even if I found a hedonistic value theory to be coherent. For that reason I cannot say I am am welfarist - I find a preference-based ethics to be the best candidate for a second-order ethics, but I am not willing to see preferentism as a theory of welfare itself. Since I do not accept preferentism as the best theory of welfare, I cannot call myself a welfarist, for my approval of preference-based ethics is not based on my conception of welfare. What this means is that the greatest good for a person is not necessarily what is ethically important. There are some qualifications, of course, and these will be explored in due course.
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Anyway that's it, folks.

11 comments:

  1. So I meant to comment a week or so ago when I first read this, but somehow I didn't find the time (or peace & quiet) until now.

    Correct me if this is off base, but doesn't The Separation Of Wellbeing And Morality entail the abandonment of consequentialism? Like, all consequentialism, seeing as consequentialists always start out by identifying terminal value(s) and from there it's simply a matter of guarding against the disvalue(s).

    I'm not saying The Separation entails moral absolutism, but if wellbeing itself doesn't capture the most crucial aspect of moral life, or indeed the entirety of moral life, something like proportionalism would serve as the go-to replacement. Either that, or contractarianism. I doubt you're a contractarian or anything like that, as those theories exclude non-human animals from moral consideration at the outset. But then, if hedonism is disconnected from morality, this greatly diminishes our reasons to put animals' interests on par with human interests. This is what's so appealing about welfarism for me. I don't see a non-welfarist or anti-welfarist approach to anti-speciesism. The moment welfarism goes, the brand of morality that remains collapses into human exceptionalism.

    Or is there a way around that? I mean, consequentialism without exception says the good is prior to the right, and for this to pack any punch analytically, the good cannot ever be independent of the right or vice versa. But this is basically what you're concluding when you argue that wellbeing (goodness) broadly speaking and morality (rightness) play on separate courts.

    The only other explanation is that consequentialism remains viable in light of a commitment to aesthetic value or something like that. And that would be a 180 in your case, at least if we compare this development to your other (largely pessimistic) tendencies. Aesthetic Realism = magical thinking.

    So, yeah, you've really stumped me with this excerpt.

    FYI: I've also taken a step back from preferentism, for now. Not because hedonism started to look superior, but because I've come to terms with the obvious limits of human rationality. I was never an "actualist preferentist" and simply thought "ideal preferentism" took care of all the problems stemming from actual, short-sighted, ill-conceived preferences in real space. Now I see that even ideal preferences can serve as a de facto booster of moral conventionalism, because the average human brain seems incorrigible when it comes to agreeing with or even just grasping a lion's share of what we value. (though maybe I shouldn't say "we" at this point)

    I don't want to go full-blown Objective List Theory with my replacement of preferentism, but I don't want to go the monistic hedonism route either. Caught in limbo at the moment. Regardless, I maintain that welfare broadly speaking is the way to go, even if the specifics remain blurry.

    Overall though, you've got me hooked with this excerpt. Looking forward to reading the rest, hopefully sooner than later.

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    1. Thanks for dropping by, ABM.

      "Correct me if this is off base, but doesn't The Separation Of Wellbeing And Morality entail the abandonment of consequentialism?"

      I don't think so. It's not incoherent to be a consequentialist about, say, the production of Asian lemons, and see the maximization of Asian lemons as the greatest good. It would be a very silly consequentialism, of course, but there's nothing inherently problematic with identifying the good in a consequentialist theory with a non-welfare (or non-hedonic) good. Indeed we might be consequentialists about, say, diversity, or creativity. Who knows.

      "Or is there a way around that? I mean, consequentialism without exception says the good is prior to the right, and for this to pack any punch analytically, the good cannot ever be independent of the right or vice versa. But this is basically what you're concluding when you argue that wellbeing (goodness) broadly speaking and morality (rightness) play on separate courts."

      I approach this from the angle of seeing different sorts of relevant values. For instance, I identify attitudinal pleasures/pains as *prudential* welfare goods for a person, but (and I'm simplifying here), preferences as the primary ethical good in the consequentialist framework. The point I made at the end of this except was that the greatest good for a person is not necessarily what is ethically relevant. It's a rejection of welfarism. There are prudential goods, aesthetic goods, ethical goods, etc.

      I haven't made any recent posts so this may come as a surprise but I'm not really a consequentialist, at least not in the "primary" sense. I don't think consequentialism can ever be a satisfactory moral theory, but it is an attractive option for circumstances that are not satisfactory to begin with. As of now I am extremely sympathetic to W.D. Ross' ethic of prima facie (incommensurable) duties, which includes duties of beneficence. Interestingly enough Ross also has a theory of (incommensurable) goods, like pleasure, knowledge and survival. Ross' theory is very attractive to me, because I don't see any form of ethical monism (utilitarianism, Kant's C.I., virtue, etc) to be convincing, let along *liveable*.

      In regards to non-human animals, I'm bouncing back and forth between the idea of them having preferences. If they don't have any real preferences that aren't basic, then a form of paternalism isn't problematic. But it could also be problematic to simply assume they don't have preferences. We might not be in the epistemic situation to really know this.

      So safe to say I still have "consequentialist" leanings but not in the sense that I see the morality of actions as solely dependent on a prediction of consequences. Ross' notice of the regret we feel when making consequentialist decisions is evidence that we don't actually just value the consequences alone, even if we may value them more than other things in certain cases. One of the major points of the book I'm writing is that the world we live it fails to provide an adequate foundation for our morality. We literally have to put together a hodge-podge system of values and principles. It's not perfect, it'll never be perfect. And that's not a good thing. The existence of *real* moral dilemmas is a very bad thing.

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    2. Can you give an example of a prudential good, and how it differs form an ethical good? Taking into account the broadness of some/most consequentialist formulations of "ethical good"?

      If this is covered in an upcoming excerpt(s), don't worry about replying to it now. I'll be reading everything you post.

      "Ross' notice of the regret we feel when making consequentialist decisions is evidence that we don't actually just value the consequences alone"

      How is this very regret something other than a negative consequence; one that any consequentialist is free to take into account? I can understand Ross taking issue with consequentialists stressing that it shouldn't be thought of as an overriding negative consequence (depending on the all-things-considered level of goodness the act produced), but I don't see how the regret alone sheds a negative light on forward-looking moral thinking.

      Perhaps what Ross really opposes is agent-neutrality. Objections along those lines typically appeal to intuitions. But intuitions are products of evolutionary arbitrariness. The intuition says hit the switch to save 5, but don't directly push a person to his death to save 5. I'm yet to hear an argument for why analytic ethical thinking should be hostage to such gut instincts. If we evolved alongside trollies & switches, & used them for combat, they'd likely be as off-putting on the gut level as the direct shove-to-save-five method is.

      "there's nothing inherently problematic with identifying the good in a consequentialist theory with a non-welfare (or non-hedonic) good"

      Which is why I threw in this part: "The only other explanation is that consequentialism remains viable in light of a commitment to aesthetic value or something like that. And that would be a 180 in your case, at least if we compare this development to your other (largely pessimistic) tendencies."

      Maybe you don't think it makes sense to file creativity or diversity under aesthetic value, but I see no way around it. If creativity/diversity are desired, then they are to be filed as 'value for' & not 'value simpliciter'. If they're good 'for' someone, it's because that someone desires them, which brings us back to welfarism in the form of preferentism/desire theories. If they're good in the value simpliciter sense, you're ultimately objecting to person-affecting views, because you now believe in world-affecting views (much harder to argue for AN on those grounds, as I'm sure you're aware).

      But to believe that world-affecting views are steeped in moral value, rather than aesthetic value, is to mistake the map for the territory. If you agree with that much, I can only foresee a disagreement persisting because I'm an aesthetic anti-realist and you're seemingly not.

      Ugh... looks like I'm gonna have to split this into two comments. Hate doing that.

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    3. 2/2

      Anyway, I'm familiar with Ross through SEP and wiki only, so maybe you can clear this up for me: Isn't he officially a deontologist? A pluralist, sure, but with a heavy deontological slant. So do you now identify as a deontological pluralist?

      "Ross' ethic of prima facie (incommensurable) duties"

      Does he specify where these fall on doing vs. allowing harm? I take it that incommensurability makes the whole thing far less demanding compared to a straightforwardly impartial consequentialism that you advocated for in the not-too-distant past. I vividly recall a post where you rightly charge moral philosophers, past and present, with going to great lengths to come up with clever rationalizations so as to not accept the moral urgency of disallowing harm (i.e. just look at the world). I don't see how the main parts of that still apply under talks of incommensurability. I don't see how a pessimistic or negative take on Population Ethics survives either.

      That said, I actually don't think commensurability is easily justified. But that never stopped me from caring about certain extremely bad things infinitely more than I care about certain other bad things (aesthetic or other). Even if what I care about is foundationally shaky, I'm still going to find myself caring about it at the end of the day. Call it incorrigibility, but I am all too willing to accept an infinite loss in non-welfarist goods like creativity if that's the only way to save one individual from having to spend 5 minutes in the lava chamber. I assume that, for you, that's no longer an acceptable bargain? You seem to hold that, with enough pluralistic ingredients, the prevention of non-welfare based badness (what I'd simply call aesthetic badness) can at some point override the prevention of the most intolerable torture, as the actualization of non-welfarist goods are in the ballpark of welfarist ones. Standard broadening of final value (or: final concern). How things change.

      "I'm bouncing back and forth between the idea of them having preferences"

      I brought up animals because I wanted to know where they fit in under this pluralistic deontological scheme. Say they don't have preferences. Would this lessen their moral status? Hard to see how it wouldn't under a theory that broadens final concern beyond welfare. Seems a recipe for human exceptionalism, and yes, speciesism.

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    4. 1/?

      ABM -

      "How is this very regret something other than a negative consequence; one that any consequentialist is free to take into account? I can understand Ross taking issue with consequentialists stressing that it shouldn't be thought of as an overriding negative consequence (depending on the all-things-considered level of goodness the act produced), but I don't see how the regret alone sheds a negative light on forward-looking moral thinking."

      The consequentialist can absolutely look at these negative side-effects and take them into account. The claim, however, is that this is a theoretical abstraction from the immediate experience. It happens usually *after* the fact. One of Ross' examples is: you are driving down the highway to pick a friend up from the airport. You see three homeless people on the side of the road. You can stop and give them food, money, or transportation to a shelter, but this will make you late in picking up your friend. Or you can drive past them and be on time for your friend.

      If you're a consequentialist, then you can say, maybe the annoyance my friend will feel at me being late is less important than the homeless dudes' feelings. But that's really not what is going on when we deliberate. We are actually deliberating between two things: beneficence, and fidelity. Do I help these strangers, or do I keep my promise?

      Let's say you choose to help the strangers. This does not necessarily mean you chose this because you did a rough calculation in your head beforehand. For some reason or another you chose beneficence over fidelity, and you probably regret having to break your promise with your friend. Not just because your friend will be annoyed but also because breaking promises *in general* is something we ought not do.

      The point is not that these other things, like fidelity, cannot be assimilated into a consequentialist framework, but that doing so is unnatural, artificial and not all too satisfying. Consequentialism's greatest asset is it's impartiality - nobody matters more than anyone else. It takes common-sense morality and assimilates it into this scheme. I'm not going to go into crazy depth but I think this monism (or any monism really) cannot take into account the whole of human morality. There are things, like fidelity, that *resist* being "consequentialized", which means we find them to be independently important - even if, at the end of the day, the duty of beneficence is taken as primary.

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    5. 2/?
      "But intuitions are products of evolutionary arbitrariness."

      If this is true (which I think it is), then the intuition that the consequences matter more than anything else is also an intuition. *Intuitively*, it seems as though preventing five people from being tortured is a better option than preventing one person from being tortured. Consequentialists often pride themselves as taking a "mathematical" approach to ethics and emulating the sciences as much as they can. But the decision to base morality on impartiality comes from an intuition, an allegedly self-evident idea.

      " If creativity/diversity are desired, then they are to be filed as 'value for' & not 'value simpliciter'."

      I'm not sure why this necessarily follows. It seems to collapse the possibility of any good *that*s. The fact that I value creativity does not mean that creativity is only good insofar as I value it. Perhaps, as the Greeks might have it, I have creativity as a good *because it is a good*. My desire for creativity does not make it a good - rather, creativity is a good and I desire it because of this. Just as an example.

      "Anyway, I'm familiar with Ross through SEP and wiki only, so maybe you can clear this up for me: Isn't he officially a deontologist? A pluralist, sure, but with a heavy deontological slant. So do you now identify as a deontological pluralist?"

      Ross is a deontologist but not the stupid kind. LOL what I mean by that is that Ross is against both monism and *absolutism*.

      For Ross, there is no one single principle that can encompass our moral views, and there also are no things that we absolutely are not allowed to do, not matter what.

      As to what I "identify" now as, I would say I am a pluralist of duties, the most fundamental being that of non-harm and non-manipulation.

      " I vividly recall a post where you rightly charge moral philosophers, past and present, with going to great lengths to come up with clever rationalizations so as to not accept the moral urgency of disallowing harm (i.e. just look at the world)."

      Yeah, I remember that post. I think it applies to moral absolutists (i.e. it's wrong, no matter what, to kill, lie, steal, etc). Moral absolutism is irrational and untenable. Whereas there are many non-consequentialist moral philosophers who are willing to accept the same conclusion as consequentialits but under different pretences.

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    6. 3/3
      "Call it incorrigibility, but I am all too willing to accept an infinite loss in non-welfarist goods like creativity if that's the only way to save one individual from having to spend 5 minutes in the lava chamber. I assume that, for you, that's no longer an acceptable bargain?"

      No, I think I would definitely accept seemingly-infinite loss in non-welfare goods to prevent that lava torture. Would I do the same to prevent a person from getting a headache? Where's the cut-off? The view I have is that there is a cutoff but we can't identify it, same as Ross. We come to realize it on a situation-by-situation basis - sacrificing an entire museum of modern art (yuck) to prevent lava torture seems obvious, but destroying an ancient dinosaur bone to prevent a headache is unacceptable to me, and not simply because the loss of a dinosaur bone would make a lot of people sad. (The consequentialist is always ready to assimilate these intuitions into the broader framework - things are no longer intrinsically valuable but are merely instrumentally valuable to the overall state of affairs.). If the stakes get "high enough" then the consequences are obviously going to take precedence. When things are not so drastic, we feel much more justified and comfortable in taking liberties and being partial - these are situations in which the consequences literally don't matter. They aren't important enough to.

      "I brought up animals because I wanted to know where they fit in under this pluralistic deontological scheme. Say they don't have preferences. Would this lessen their moral status? Hard to see how it wouldn't under a theory that broadens final concern beyond welfare. Seems a recipe for human exceptionalism, and yes, speciesism."

      I seem to recall you saying something about preferentism for rational agents and hedonism for the instinctual "creatures" sometime ago. I'm working with something similar. I definitely see the recipe for speciesism and I want to avoid that.

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  2. All things that darthbarracuda said are entirely bullshit.

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  3. The brain cells of darthbarracuda cannot functionally work.

    ReplyDelete
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